Influence
Part 9  The Marketplace of Attention
Chapter 259 of 360

Hot Startup, Cold Data: How the Wall Street Journal Broke Theranos

John Carreyrou got a phone call from a pathologist named Adam Clapper, who had read a New Yorker profile of Elizabeth Holmes and could not understand how the technology could work.

That was the beginning. The reporting took nine months, and its central difficulty was not analytical.

Theranos had built an information environment. Employees were siloed so that no one saw the whole; the chemistry team did not know what the device team knew, and the laboratory staff did not know what was being told to investors. Non-disclosure agreements were aggressive and enforced. Departing employees were followed by lawyers from Boies Schiller. Tyler Shultz, who had raised concerns internally and was the grandson of a board member, was pursued through his own family.

That structure is chapter 201's milieu control, transplanted into a corporation, and its effect is precise: it prevents the formation of shared knowledge.

The obstacle to exposure was therefore not that nobody knew. Many people knew fragments. The obstacle was pluralistic ignorance, which chapter 9 describes — each person with a doubt had no way to discover that others held the same doubt, and in the absence of that discovery, each concluded that their own concern was probably a misunderstanding of something they could not see.

Alan Beam, the laboratory director, was the person who broke it. He had left the company, and he talked. Erika Cheung filed a complaint with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Tyler Shultz talked, at very substantial personal cost.

The Wall Street Journal published on 15 October 2015. Six days later Holmes appeared on stage at the paper's own conference, was interviewed by Jonathan Krebs about the article, and said that this is what happens when you work to change things — first they think you're crazy, then they fight you, and then all of a sudden you change the world.

The regulatory finding came in early 2016, and by mid-2016 the company had voided two years of results from its own devices.

The general finding this case contributes is about what breaks an information silo, and it is not evidence. Evidence existed inside the building for years.

What breaks it is one person saying the thing out loud to someone outside, which converts private doubt into shared knowledge, at which point the cascade reverses and everyone who had been silent finds that they were not alone. The cost of being that person is high enough that most people do not pay it, which is why these things last as long as they do.

The case

John Carreyrou’s Wall Street Journal investigation published 15 October 2015, ‘Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With Its Blood-Test Technology’, built on former laboratory director Alan Beam and other insiders, followed by Holmes' onstage denial at WSJD Live on 21 October 2015.

The mechanism

Exposure required breaking information control: Theranos enforced non-disclosure and compartmentalization so that no single employee held a disconfirming whole — the milieu control Robert Lifton described, transplanted into a corporation. Whistleblowing then had to overcome pluralistic ignorance, the state Latane and Darley studied in which each observer assumes their private doubt is idiosyncratic. One insider’s testimony converted private doubt into shared knowledge, and the cascade reversed.

What this chapter covers

  1. A startup wrapped in non-disclosure
  2. Compartmentalization prevents shared doubt
  3. WSJ story 15 October 2015; onstage denial 21 October
  4. Employees discover their doubts were shared
  5. Lab director’s testimony anchors the reporting

Cross-ref: Defense — Breaking Information Silos